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ARTICLE 9 IN THE POST-SUNAKAWA WORLD: 
CONTINUITY AND DETERRENCE WITHIN A 
TRANSFORMING GLOBAL CONTEXT  
John O. Haley∗ 
Abstract:  The 1959 Supreme Court Grand Bench (en banc) decision in 
Sakata v. Japan1 (the Sunakawa case) was the first Supreme Court decision on Article 9 
and the constitutionality of Japan's defense policies.  In the precedent-setting decision, all 
fifteen justices endorsed the view that under Article 9 Japan retained a fundamental right 
of self-defense and could enter into treaties for mutual security.  In the absence of an 
apparent or "clear" violation, the courts, Sunakawa held, must defer to the judgment of 
the political branches on the issue of constitutionality.  The Court thereby established the 
outer parameters for judicial review and the scope of legislative and executive discretion.  
For half a century the decision has remained the controlling interpretation of Article 9.  
Reserving the right to adjudicate future cases only in the event of an apparent violation, 
the Court enabled successive Governments to make defense policy decisions based on 
political and public consensus and policy concerns circumscribed by only a possibility of 
judicial review.  The result has been remarkable.  Since 1959 Japan has pursued a 
consistent set of policies that have both expanded Japanese defensive military capacity 
and enabled effective deterrence within a transforming global context.   
 
The varied interpretations of Article 9 that have been expressed over the years, I 
would emphasize, have been political not legal—or at least not as constitutional law.   
Yet a political consensus has endured that enables Japan to possess, as detailed below, the 
most technologically advanced defensive military in East Asia.  No amendment of the 
Constitution has been necessary for the consistent development of defensive forces and a 
security alliance with the United States that arguably has for three generations ensured 
peace in East Asia through deterrence.  As recently expressed by Satsuki Eda, the chair of 
the opposition Democratic Party’s research commission on the constitution, under Article 
9 Japan has both the legal right of individual self-defense, as well as the right of 
collective self-defense.2  Nonetheless, the political constraints have been significant as 
Japanese Governments with few exceptions have declined since 1960 to enter into any 
other collective security arrangements much less to exercise a right of individual or 
collective self-defense. 
 
I.   THE DEBATE—PAST AND PRESENT 
Few if any legal and political issues in Japan over the past seven 
decades have engendered as much continuous public controversy and debate 
∗  William R. Orthwein Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, Washington University in St.  
Louis; Affiliate and Visiting Professor of Law, University of Washington (Seattle). 
1  Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, no. 27660683, 13 Keishū 3225 (Japan) (translated with 
commentary in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS, 1948-60 298 (1964)) [hereinafter “the Sunakawa case”]. 
2  The right of collective self-defense is defined in the Ministry of Defense as “the right to use force 
to stop an armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close relations, even if the state itself 
is not under direct attack.”  MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF JAPAN, WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2012, 
110 (2012), http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2012/18_Part2_Chapter1_Sec2.pdf.  The White 
Papers state the official defense policies of the Government. 
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as Article 9 and the existence and role of the Self-Defense Forces.3  In 1950 
the first armed services—the National Police Reserve (renamed the National 
Safety Forces in 1952) and the Coastal Safety Force—under a National 
Security Board were established.  In 1954 they were reorganized and 
expanded as the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (Army), the Japan 
Maritime Self-Defense Force (Navy) and the Japan Air Self-Defense Force 
(Air Force) under a newly reorganized Defense Agency, which was 
reorganized as the Ministry of Defense in 2007.  From 1950 to the present, 
the existence of a military establishment and its role have generated repeated 
partisan controversy, public protests, and litigation.  The protests against the 
1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty united a diverse group of over a hundred 
civic and political organizations that from 1959 into 1960 engaged in a 
massive campaign that resulted in the cancellation of U.S. President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s 1960 visit to Japan, albeit not the ultimate ratification of the 
treaty.  The campaign also sparked additional protests that led to the 
resignation of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi and ushered in an over half-
century-long era of continuity of constitutional law and policy, ending, many 
believe, perhaps not so ironically, with the premiership of Kishi’s grandson, 
Shinzō Abe. 
Abe took the first steps toward revision of the Government’s defense 
policy during his first term in office (2006-2008).  He began with an effort to 
develop a consensus for reform first within the Liberal Democratic Party 
(“LDP”) and then the broader community by establishing an Advisory Panel 
on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security.   
The panel’s principal focus was the decades-long ban on collective 
self-defense.  Highlighted were four scenarios: (1) defense of U.S. naval 
vessels on the high seas; (2) interception of ballistic missiles that might be 
heading toward the United States; (3) use of weapons in international 
peacekeeping operations; and (4) logistic support for the operations of other 
countries in international peacekeeping operations by the United Nations.4  
In June 2008, the panel issued its report, which argued for a revised 
interpretation of the Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of 
collective self-defense and participate in peace keeping operations 
categorized as collective security measures under UN auspices (third and 
3   For a descriptive summary of the Japanese “civil society” responses, see Millie Creighton, Civil 
Society Volunteers Supporting Japan’s Constitution, Article 9 and Associated Peace, Diversity, and Post-
3.11 Environmental Issues, 26 VOLUNTAS 121 (2015). 
4  For the 2008 report, see Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for 
Security (2008), http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou/report.pdf. 
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fourth cases) and recommended that it introduce new legislation to permit 
action in all four cases.5  Abe had already resigned as prime minister 
ostensibly for health reasons in September 2007.  No further action was 
taken on the recommendations until Abe returned as prime minister almost 
exactly five years later.  Within weeks he had reconvened the Advisory 
Panel.  Its final report, released in May 2014, provided the basis for the Abe 
Government to adopt new guidelines, issued on July 1, 2014, for Japan’s 
defense policy and the Government’s interpretation of Article 9.6  To some, 
the new guidelines “gutted” Article 9.  In August, tens of thousands joined 
protests in Tokyo and Japan’s other major cities.  A year later in July 2016, 
the LDP, with one seat held by its coalition partner, the Komeito, won the 
needed two-thirds majority that would allow a national referendum on 
revision of Article 9.  Yet, only days before the election, LDP Vice President 
Masahiko Komura had stated “there is zero possibility” that Prime Minister 
Shinzō Abe would try to revise Article 9.7  To date no proposal for a 
referendum has been made. 
Interpretations left to elected governments are by definition subject to 
change.  What is remarkable about Article 9 is its enduring political 
viability, and the continuity of Japanese defense policy within a 
transforming global context.  Yet, despite the hyperbolic assessments, basic 
questions remain: how significant a departure from the past do the Abe 
Government’s policies portend, or whether consensus and continuity will 
continue to prevail within a transforming world.  Perhaps the most 
significant questions of all are how China will respond and whether the 
deterrence effect of Japan’s current constraints hold.8 
5  Id. 
6  See Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security (2014), 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/anzenhosyou2/dai7/houkoku_en.pdf.   
7  Reiji Yoshida, LDP vice president says ‘zero possibility’ Abe will revise Article 9 after Upper 
House poll win, THE JAPAN TIMES (July 6, 2016), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/06/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-vice-president-says-zero-
possibility-abe-will-revise-article-9-upper-house-poll-win/#.V5z4Y4-cFlY. 
8  Some might include the question of U.S. policy, but at least to date, support for the Abe 
Government proposals has been emphatic.  See, e.g., Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint 
Statement: The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (Apr. 25, 
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-
and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac. 
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II.   THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE 9 AND ITS INTERPRETATION 
 The story of Article 9 commenced with inclusion of a “renunciation of 
war” clause in the “model” constitution drafted in 1946 by a secret Steering 
Committee comprising select group of U.S. lawyers serving in the Allied 
Occupation pursuant to a command by General Douglas MacArthur as 
Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces.9  As related by Charles L.  
Kades, Deputy Chief of Government Section, the committee’s chair and 
author of the initial version of what became Article 9: 
MacArthur had directed [Courtney] Whitney [Chief of 
Government Section] to have the Government Section draft a 
model for a constitution to be handed to [Prime Minister 
Shigeru] Yoshida and [State Minister Jōji] Matsumoto for their 
consideration at the meeting which the Japanese had postponed 
to the following week . . . .  Whitney handed me a legal-size 
sheet of green-lined yellow paper on which were handwritten, 
in pencil, notes that Whitney said were to be used as the basis 
for a model constitution.10 
 
The handwritten notes (written either by MacArthur or Whitney) 
included the following provision: 
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished.  Japan 
renounces it as an instrumentality for settling its disputes and 
even preserving its own security.  It relies upon the higher 
ideals which are now stirring the world for its defence and its 
protection. 
9  For a first-hand account of the origin of Article 9 and the drafting of the Constitution, see Henry 
M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, Making the Japanese 
Constitution: Col. Kades interviewed by Prof. Haley, YOUTUBE (May 23, 1989), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jnzOU4sf3Ms.  For recent studies in English, see KENNETH L. PORT, 
TRANSCENDING LAW: THE UNINTENDED LIFE OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (2010), as 
well as two excellent Library of Congress Law Reports: LIBR. OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: INTERPRETATIONS OF 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION (20015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/interpretations-
article9.php; and LIBR. OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONSTITUTION (2006), 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/japan-constitution/article9.php.  For two studies by one of the foremost U.S. 
experts on Article 9 and Japanese defense policy, see JAMES E. AUER, THE POSTWAR REARMAMENT OF 
JAPANESE MARITIME FORCES, 1945-71 122 (1973); James E. Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: 
From Renunciation of Armed Force “Forever” to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World, 53 L. 
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (1990) [hereinafter Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution]; and James E. Auer, 
Article Nine: Renunciation of War, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79 (Percy R. Luney, Jr. & 
Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993) [hereinafter Article Nine: Renunciation]. 
10  Charles L. Kades, The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 
215, 223 (1989). 
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No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will ever be authorized 
and no right of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any 
Japanese force.11 
 
Whether the idea for such a clause originated with MacArthur himself 
or, as MacArthur later asserted and many now believe, Prime Minister 
Kijūrō Shidehara, or even Kades, remains unknown.12  Kades, however, 
considered that a renunciation of war in self-defense was unrealistic.  In 
drafting the initial version of Article 9, he thus deleted the phrase “even 
preserving its own security.”13  He also considered undesirable any express 
reservation of a right to self-defense.  For Kades, the article did not require 
any explicit mention of such right.  As with the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
the right to self-defense was implicit.14  Moreover, as Kades told the author 
during an interview in 1989, in the context of Japan’s use of “self-defense” 
as a justification for the attack on Pearl Harbor, any such provision would 
have been politically unacceptable.15 
As ordered, the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP) 
Steering Committee completed its model constitution within one week.  On 
February 13, 1946, General Whitney handed it over to the Japanese 
government.  The “renunciation of war” provision as drafted by Kades read 
as follows: 
11  Id. 
12  Despite attribution to MacArthur by both Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) Shigeru 
Yoshida as well as Shidehara himself (see SHIGERU YOSHIDA, THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS: THE STORY OF 
JAPAN IN CRISIS 137 (Kenichi Yoshida trans., William Heinemann Ltd 1961) (1961) (cited in Auer, Article 
Nine of Japan’s Constitution, supra note 9, at 173)), the evidence in favor of Shidehara as the source is 
quite strong.  See Kenzo Takayanagi, Some Reminiscences of Japan's Commission on the Constitution, in 
THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-1967 (Dan Fenno Henderson ed., 1968) 71, 
79, 86.  Dale Hellegers suggests that the idea may have come to MacArthur via a similar provision in the 
1935 Philippine Constitution.  2 DALE M. HELLEGERS, WE, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE: WORLD WAR II AND 
THE ORIGINS OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION 576 (2001).  Theodore McNelly, on the other hand, suggests 
Kades himself could have been the source, a comment made in Kades' presence that he did not expressly 
disavow.  Theodore McNelly, General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan, 
in TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF JAPAN, THIRD SERIES VOL. 17, (1982) 32–33; Charles L. 
Kades, Discussion of Professor Theodore McNelly's Paper, 'General Douglas MacArthur and the 
Constitutional Disarmament of Japan, in [Third Series Vol. XVII] TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC 
SOCIETY OF JAPAN 35–52 (1982).  I have previously suggested that Kades himself could have earlier 
suggested a renunciation of war provision but, without first-hand knowledge of MacArthur's thoughts, 
could not have known whether such remark could have been the source for MacArthur's idea.  John O. 
Haley, Waging War: Japan's Constitutional Constraints, 14 CONST. F. 18, 21 (2005). 
13  Id. 
14  For details of the Kellogg-Briand Pact including the right to self-defense, see OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, THE KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT, 1928, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg. 
15  See McNelly, supra note 12. 
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Article VIII   War as a sovereign right of the nation is 
abolished.   The threat or use of force is forever renounced as a 
means for settling disputes with any other nation.   
 
No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be 
authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred 
upon the State.16 
 
A drafting session ensued comprising the SCAP Steering Committee 
and members of the Japanese committee responsible for a revised 
constitution headed initially by Jōji Matsumoto and, upon his withdrawal, 
Tatsuo Satō of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau.  After an intense thirty-two 
hours of continuous negotiations, they agreed on a final draft, which 
MacArthur almost immediately approved.  Included was Article 9, which 
was almost identical to Article 8 of the SCAP draft.    
Article IX.   War, as a sovereign right of the nation, and the 
threat or use of force, is forever renounced as a means of 
settling disputes with other nations. 
 
The maintenance of land, sea, and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be authorized.  The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.17  
 
The Emperor subsequently introduced the final draft in the Diet as a 
bill to amend the Meiji Constitution.  During the ensuing Diet session, the 
Constitutional Amendment Committee chaired by Hitoshi Ashida, who was 
to serve briefly as prime minister in a coalition Government in 1948, 
proposed additional changes. Nearly three dozen were eventually adopted.   
With respect to Article 9, the Committee introduced the phrases, which 
Ashida claimed to have written, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace 
based on justice and order” to paragraph 1 and “in order to accomplish the 
aim of the preceding paragraph” to paragraph 2.  Ashida reported to the Diet 
that the aim of the proposed changes was to express the purpose of Article 9 
not to change its meaning, which he later argued, allowed Japan to rearm for 
its self-defense.  As finally adopted, Article 9 reads: 
16  See Kades, supra note 10. 
17  NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan). 
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice 
and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a 
means of settling international disputes.   
 
2.   In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will 
never be maintained.  The right of belligerency of the state will 
not be recognized.18 
 
By the end of the Allied Occupation in May 1952, a persisting 
consensus appears to have been reached.  Article 9 prohibited Japan from 
any military action as well as armaments except for self-defense.  Every 
government since 1952—including the Social Democratic-Liberal 
Democratic coalition government (1994-1996)—had affirmed the legality of 
Japan's security arrangements and the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).  In 
December 1954, in defending funding for newly established SDF at a budget 
committee meeting, the Government proffered its official interpretation of 
the Constitution:  
The Constitution did not deny the self-defense right; Japan 
renounced war, but did not renounce the right to struggle in 
order to defend itself;  
 
Establishment of the SDF is not against the Constitution 
because SDF’s mission is self-defense and its ability is limited 
to necessary and adequate levels of self-defense.19 
 
The remaining issue—the right to enter and abide by collective 
security agreements for self-defense—was arguably resolved when Japan 
signed the United Nations Charter and joined the organization.  Recognized 
under Article 51 was, “the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” 
including Japan.  To what extent Japan could participate in collective 
security operations that did not involve self-defense was a question left 
largely unasked much less answered.   
18  Id. 
19  YOSAN IIN KAIGIROKU [BUDGET COMMITTEE MINUTES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES], 21st Diet 
Session, No. 2, 1 (Dec. 22, 1954) (Director General of the Defense Agency Seiichi Ohmura’s answer at 
Budget Committee of House of Representatives) (cited in LIBR. OF CONGRESS, JAPAN: ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at §V(F)). 
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By the end of the decade the precedent-setting decision in Sunakawa 
affirmed the political function of Article 9 without, however, establishing 
any criteria or standards for defining its legal parameters.  The case was the 
first of three en banc decisions by the Court on the constitutionality of the 
1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.20  Although the court unanimously 
affirmed Japan’s fundamental right of self-defense and legal capacity under 
Article 9 to enter treaties for mutual security, it held that unless the policies 
or actions constituted an unmistakable or "clear" violation of Article 9, the 
courts were to defer to the judgment of the political branches.21  For over 
half a century Sunakawa has remained the controlling judicial decision on 
Article 9.22  Since then the issue has been resolved as a political decision by 
the Government in power.    
In 1960 the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB)23 filled the vacuum.  In 
answer to questions raised in the Diet by opposition party members in the 
context of approval of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the CLB issued 
an interpretation of Article 9 that set parameters for any government actions 
for the next five and a half decades.  First, the Japanese Government had to 
be at least notified if not give its approval for any deployment of U.S. forces 
from Japan.  More significant, Japan could not engage in combat activities 
independently (kobetsu-teki ni), and only when directly attacked or at least 
threatened.  Article 9, in the view of the Bureau, did not permit Japan to 
otherwise participate in mutual security operations.24  This view prevailed 
for over a half century.  
20  The other two en banc decisions were Japan v. Sakane, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1969, 
no. 27670505, 214 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 260 (Japan), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: 
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70 103-31 (Hiroshi Itoh & Lawrence Ward Beer eds., 1978) 
and Ota v. Hashimoto, Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 28, 1996, no. 28011109, 50 MINSHŪ 1952 (Japan) 
(the Okinawa Bases case, translated in Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court, 
http://courts.go.jp/promjudg.nsf).  Although neither involved the constitutionality of the 1951 U.S. Japan 
Security Treaty as a primary issue, the question was raised and answered in both with express affirmation 
of the holding in Sunakawa. 
21   The Sunakawa Case, supra note 1. 
22  For discussion and references related to the petty bench decisions through 2001, see Haley, supra 
note 12. 
23  The Cabinet Legislation Bureau is an agency of the Japanese government that is attached to the 
cabinet.  It comprises highly respected, law-trained civil servants who are seconded from various ministries 
for fixed terms.  Among its functions is the drafting and review of all Government-sponsored bills and 
policies.  Such review includes constitutional interpretations.  Such agencies and functions, as exemplified 
by the Canadian Department of Justice and the French Conseil d’État, are common in most parliamentary 
systems.  For details on the CLB, see CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU, 
http://www.clb.go.jp/english/about.html. 
24  See Hayashi Shuzō, Hōsei kyoku jidai no omoide Hōsei kyoku no katsudō to anpo jōyaku no koto 
(Recollections of My Time With the Legislation Bureau Legislation Bureau Activities and the Security 
Treaty), in SHŌGEN: KINDAI HŌSEI NOKISEKI NAIKAKU HŌSEI KYOKU NO KAISŌ (TESTIMONY: THE LOCUS 
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As stated in virtually every Government White Paper on Defense 
Policy through 2014:25 
Requirements for Exercising the Right of Self-Defense 
 
The Government interprets Article 9 of the Constitution to 
mean that armed force can be used to exercise the right of self-
defense only when the following three conditions are met:  
(1)  When there is an imminent and illegitimate act of 
aggression against Japan;  
(2)  When there is no appropriate means to deal with such 
aggression other than by resorting to the right of self-defense; 
and  
(3)  When the use of armed force is confined to be the 
minimum necessary level. 
. . . . 
Geographic Boundaries within which the Right of Self-
Defense may be Exercised 
 
The use of the minimum necessary force to defend Japan 
under the right of self-defense is not necessarily confined to the 
geographic boundaries of Japanese territory, territorial waters 
and airspace.  However, it is difficult to give a general 
definition of the actual extent to which it may be used, as this 
would vary with the situation.  Nevertheless, the Government 
interprets that the Constitution does not permit armed troops to 
be dispatched to the land, sea, or airspace of other countries 
with the aim of using force; such overseas deployment of troops 
would exceed the definition of the minimum necessary level of 
self-defense. [Emphasis added.] 
 
The Right of Collective Self-Defense 
 
International law permits a state to have the right of 
collective self-defense, which is the right to use force to stop an 
armed attack on a foreign country with which the state has close 
OF LEGISLATION IN THE MODERN ERA REFLECTIONS ON THE CABINET LEGISLATION BUREAU) (Naikaku 
Hōsei Kyoku Hyakkunenshi Henshō 'inkai ed., 1985). 
25  See MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE OF JAPAN (ANNUAL WHITE PAPER), 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/. 
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relations, even if the state itself is not under direct attack.  Since 
Japan is a sovereign state, it naturally has the right of collective 
self-defense under international law.  Nevertheless, the 
Japanese Government believes that the exercise of the right of 
collective self-defense exceeds the minimum necessary level of 
self-defense authorized under Article 9 of the Constitution and 
is not permissible.  [Emphasis added.] 
 
 Japan’s first military involvement after the Allied Occupation26 was in 
what some would characterize as a collective security action that began in 
2001 in a “humanitarian” effort in support of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan.  
A week after the 9/11 attack, the Koizumi Cabinet announced its support for 
the “War on Terrorism” by sending ships to collect intelligence and provide 
supplies, medical assistance, and humanitarian relief.27  Although naval 
forces were withdrawn in 2007, the humanitarian effort continued.28  The 
first significant challenge and change with respect to the Government’s 
policy came as a result of its acquiescence to U.S. pressures to join the 
coalition formed for the 2002 invasion of Iraq.  For Japan not to join the 36 
other coalition states would arguably have isolated Japan from its peers and 
the community of industrial states with which it identified.   
The problem was that the CLB interpretation of Article 9 as reflected 
in the White Papers on Defense at least from 1981 prohibited any dispatch of 
forces abroad "with the aim of using force" (buryokukōshi no mokuteki o 
motte).  As noted by Hitotsubashi University Professor Ichirō Urata, the 
2003 White Paper revised the phrase to disallow the dispatch of armed 
forces “for the express aim of using armed force” (buryoku kōshi o mokuteki 
to shite).29  The implication is that incidental, as opposed to intentional, use 
of force is permissible.  Subsequent to the change in the language of the 
White Paper, between 2004 and 2006 Japan sent up to 600 army troops to 
the southern city of Samawah, still justified as “a humanitarian mission.”  
26  During the Korean War, the newly established National Police Reserve sent Japanese 
minesweepers to support UN forces.  One consequence was the first, and presumably only, post-World War 
II Japanese combat casualties.  Auer, Article Nine: Renunciation, supra note 9.  Auer notes that two 
minesweepers were sunk, one Japanese sailor was killed, and eight others were injured. 
27  See Tomohito Shinoda, Japan’s Response to Terrorism 1, 1 (2001), 
http://www.iuj.ac.jp/faculty/tshinoda/Japan%81fs%20Response%20to%20Terrorism.pdf 
(paper presented on October 16, 2001 at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.). 
28 See Victoria Tuke, Japan’s Crucial Role in Afghanistan, EAST-WEST CTR. (Apr. 10, 
2013), http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/26987/1/APB%20no.%20206.pdf. 
29  Urata Ichirō, Sengo kenpō seiji ni okeru 9 jō no igi [Meaning of Article 9 in the Context of 
Postwar Constitutional Politics] 1260 JURISUTO 50, 54 (2004) (cited in Haley, supra note 12). 
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Opposition in the Diet forced the Government to cancel any extension.  Even 
so, since 2006 Japan's air force has airlifted materials and armed troops from 
Kuwait to locations in Iraq, including Baghdad, in support of U.S.-led 
forces.  In January 2007 the Government authorized a more limited mission 
that only allowed Japanese ships to refuel those of other nations on anti-
terror patrols. 
Whether such actions should be characterized as examples of Japan’s 
exercise of a right to collective security actions or to collective self-defense 
is less consequential than the more recent series of confrontations with 
China in the East and South China Seas.  The actions by the Abe 
Government should only be viewed in this context.  They also cannot be 
fully assessed without an understanding of the remarkable consistency over 
the course of a half-century in the nature and growth of Japan’s military 
capacity under Article 9.   
III.   JAPAN’S MILITARY CAPACITY WITHIN A TRANSFORMING GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
Until 2015 no aspect of Japan’s defense policy was more constant or 
consistent than the growth of its military capacity.  Successive Japanese 
Governments maintained an almost constant half-century policy to maintain 
defense spending at about one percent of the Gross National Product.30  
Japan’s defense spending has increased in accordance with its economic 
growth-especially through the early 1960s, reaching 4.159 trillion yen (US$ 
41,159 billion) by 1990.31  By then Japan had the second largest national 
economy and correspondingly the third largest defense budget in the world.  
As Auer explained in a footnote: 
Japan's 1988 defense budget was approximately $30 billion 
using then-current exchange.  The 1987 budgets of the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany range 
in the high $20 billion to low $30 billion range.  Japan, 
however, does not include in its defense budget certain items 
that NATO countries do include for the purpose of comparing 
30  The 1% constraint has not been a fixed limitation.  The figure apparently dates from a 1976 
National Defense Program Outline.  As Auer points out, in 1976 the Miki Government did fix defense 
spending at that percentage of the GNP but only "for the time being."  Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s 
Constitution, supra note 9, at 180.  In 1987 the Nakasone Cabinet introduced a non-quantitative limit but 
spending—even under Abe—has never exceeded the 1% by a significant amount. 
31  The defense budget figures are expressed in yen with U.S. dollar equivalents provided at a 
constant at US$1 per ¥100.  Because of continuous fluctuations in exchange rates a U.S. dollar figure tends 
to misrepresent the actual budget and fails to reflect accurately the real changes in amount. 
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individual countries' relative burden sharing.  Using NATO 
criteria, Japan's 1988 budget would be approximately $40 
billion, exceeding the budgets of Great Britain, France, and the 
Federal Republic of Germany.  Japan's budgets are also 
increasing at about 5% annual real growth in the 1980s, far 
faster than these NATO countries.  Thus, Japan's hold on third 
place should solidify in the 1990s if trends continue.32  
 
But the “trends” did not continue.  In 1989 the collapse of real estate 
prices and the soaring stock market of the 1980s ushered in two and a half 
decades of economic stagnation.  The highest rate of economic growth since 
1989 was 3.20 percent reached in the second quarter of 1990.  The record 
low was -4 percent in the first quarter of 2009.   Within the same one percent 
constraint, the defense budget also stagnated at less than 1 percent of GNP, 
increasing in real terms from 4.1 trillion yen in 1991 and 4.55 trillion in 
1992 to 4.96 trillion in 2001.  Japan's defense-related expenditure declined, 
albeit only slightly, every year thereafter until 2016.  Peaking at 4.95 trillion 
yen in fiscal 2002, by 2015 it had decreased to 4.82 trillion yen (US $41.12 
billion).  The Abe Cabinet’s 5.05 trillion yen ($50 billion) defense budget 
for 2016 thus represented at best a 20 percent increase, still less than 2 
percent of the country’s GNP for 2015.  The increase is hardly as significant 
as generally portrayed.33  Even assuming that other national defense budgets 
do not increase as exponentially, Japan will hardly regain its third-place 
ranking in defense spending and will continue to remain well behind both 
the U.S. and China not to mention Russia and the United Kingdom.  Japan is 
arguably playing more of a game of gradual “catch-up” than one of “one-up-
manship.” 
Although in 2015 Global Fire Power ranked Japan fourth in overall 
military capacity in the Asia/Pacific region, behind Russia (#1), China (#2), 
and India (#3), and sixth in defense spending overall, behind the United 
States (#1), China (#2), Saudi Arabia (#3), the United Kingdom (#4), and 
Russia (#5),34 Japan is credited with having one of the world’s most 
32  Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution, supra note 9, at 179; Bender & Lubin, infra note 35. 
33 See, e.g., Kirk Spitzer, Japan approves record-high budget, focusing on defense, economic 
recovery, USA TODAY (March 29, 2016, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/29/japan-government-defense-budget-economic-
recovery/82376314. 
34 Defense Budget by Country, GLOBAL FIREPOWER, http://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-
spending-budget.asp. 
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advanced defensive military capacities.35  In terms of naval power, Japan 
remains unsurpassed in Asia behind only the US (#1), with the most 
advanced technologies and the largest number of both aircraft carriers and 
destroyers, including a 600-foot, 13,500-ton helicopter carrier, and four 
Kongo-class Aegis destroyers.  In addition, the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
also has 16 submarines and 170 combat aircraft.  Reportedly, Japan is 
quietly upgrading its F-15 and F-2 fighters and increasing its submarine 
fleet, with improved propulsion systems on its already advanced, stealthy 
Soryu-class submarines.36  Japan does not possess nuclear weapons and has 
no intercontinental ballistic missiles or other clearly offensive weaponry.37  
However, over the past two decades Japan has gradually yielded to China its 
premier military status in Asia.  
IV.   A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE WITHIN A CHANGING GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Writing in the late 1980s, James Auer could properly explain the 
justification (from a U.S. perspective) of Japan’s military capacity in terms 
of deterrence of any aggressive stance threatening Japan by the Soviet 
Union: 
Japan's survival in case of a major U.S.-Soviet military 
confrontation is extremely doubtful, given the value of Japan's 
economy and its proximity to Soviet territory.  Japan's small 
size and vulnerable location seriously limit its war-fighting 
capability now and in the future.  However, the Soviet Union 
must first concentrate its military efforts on Eastern Europe and 
on its long border with China before contemplating a potential 
third front in the Pacific.  Consequently, the strategic 
importance of Japan's location, Tokyo's ability to finance a 
high-technology air defense and antisubmarine barrier 500 
miles either side of Vladivostok, and a nuclear blackmail shield 
provided by the United States combine to provide Japan with a 
very strong war-deterring capability.  A strong deterrent 
35  See Jeremy Bender & Gus Lubin, Why Japan’s Smaller Military Could Hold Its Own Against 
China, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/japans-smaller-military-
could-match-china-2014-5. 
36  For an overview of the 2016 defense budget and programs to be funded, see MINISTRY OF 
DEFENSE, DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND BUDGET OF JAPAN: OVERVIEW OF FY2016 BUDGET (2015), 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/280330.pdf. 
37  Whether Japan could constitutionally develop nuclear weapons is another unanswered question.  
Perhaps this would be deemed a “clear” violation of Article 9 by the courts.  Nevertheless, successive 
prime ministers have maintained that it would be permissible. 
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obviously benefits Japan and, given the increasing economic 
importance of the Pacific Basin, the United States, and many 
other countries as well.38 
 
By the turn of the 21st century, however, such arguments had become almost 
irrelevant.  By then the Soviet Union had collapsed, but an even more 
portentous regional military power had emerged in China. 
 Not until the 1949 advent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
had China posed any threat to Japan.  Quite the opposite had been true since 
1895 and the first Sino-Japanese War.  Even then, enthralled in decades of 
political and economic turmoil, China could be viewed without unease by 
Japan.  Within the protective umbrella provided by the United States, not to 
mention its own military and economic superiority, the PRC posed no 
danger to Japanese interests.  A decade after the victory over the Republican 
Government, the PRC experienced first the famine triggered by the "Great 
Leap Forward”—as described by perhaps biased observers—“one of the 
largest man-made disasters in human history.  Estimates of the number of 
casualties vary greatly and are difficult, if not impossible, to verify.  
Conservative calculations posit that from 1958 to 1961 over 14 million 
people died of starvation.39  The economic disasters of the “Great Leap 
Forward” were then compounded by those of the “Cultural Revolution” 
between 1966 and 1978 during which time nearly all economic activities 
ceased.  Education came to a halt.  Agricultural production stagnated.  
Factory production was disrupted.   Shortages of raw materials, supplies and 
even labor ensued.  Nearly all professionals—doctors, teachers, professors, 
scientists and technicians, religious leaders, virtually anyone with expertise 
or knowledge—were denounced and prosecuted.  Hence until the 1980s 
China posed no serious economic competition or military threat for Japan. 
 The reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping from 1978 until his 
retirement as paramount leader in 1989 transformed China and the world 
economy.   The combination of political stability and a relatively free and 
competitive market economy propelled China to regain its global 
preeminence.  2014 marked the first time since 1820 that China had the 
38  Auer, Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution, supra note 9, at 185–86. 
39  Gerhard K. Heilig, Timeline: Details: 1959-1961, CHINA-PROFILE (Apr. 18, 2012),  
http://www.china-profile.com/history/indepth/id_27.htm (citing: Basil Ashton et al., Famine in China, 
1958-61, in 10 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 613 (1984); Thomas P. Bernstein, Stalinism, Famine, and 
Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great Leap Forward, in 13 THEORY AND SOC’Y 339 
(1984); and Peng Xizhe, Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces, in 
13 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 639 (1987). 
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world’s largest national economy.  It had overtaken the United States, not to 
mention Japan and Germany, as measured by GNP, as the world’s largest 
trading nation in terms of both exports and imports, creating in the process a 
global network of mutual economic dependency.   China also achieved the 
position as the world’s third largest military power, spending more on its 
military in 2015 than Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan 
combined. 
For Japan this transformation has had predictable consequences.  For 
the first time in over a century Japan was no longer East Asia’s foremost 
economic and military power.  That fact alone inevitably provoked 
nationalist sentiments.  In addition, however, since the mid 1990s China had 
begun to make territorial claims to increasingly large swathes of the East 
China and South China seas.40  In 1994 China occupied the Mischief (Meiji) 
reef in the Spratly Islands, virtually ignoring conflicting claims by Taiwan, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam.  In 1995 China reached an accommodation 
with the Philippines, but tensions continued as China repeatedly objected to 
any oil exploration in the South China Sea.  Similar conflicts occurred with 
respect to claims to territory and airspace in the East China Sea.  The most 
longstanding has been the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands 
(Diaoyu Islands for the Chinese) that sit offshore Okinawa.  Comprising five 
uninhabited islets and three rocks, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have been 
claimed by China and Japan as well as Taiwan.  “The sovereignty claims 
involve fishing rights as well as potential oil and natural gas exploration 
rights.”  They came under Japanese control along with Taiwan at the end the 
first Sino-Japanese war in 1895, but after WWII remained under U.S. 
occupation until 1972 with reversion of Okinawa to Japan.  In 2012 Japan 
purchased three of the islands from a private owner.  In 2013 a second issue 
emerged when China proclaimed a new Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) across the East China Sea.   
In this context, not only does the 2016 Abe military budget seem 
remarkably moderate, but also Article 9 can be viewed as continuing to play 
a profound political role in maintaining peace through deterrence.  But for 
Article 9, Japan’s successive postwar Governments would have had to 
justify on purely policy grounds any constraint on military spending and the 
role of armed forces.  The outcomes of public debates would have been less 
40  For a concise account of the history of Chinese claims in the South China Sea through 2011, see 
M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Strategy in the South China Sea, 33 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 292 (2011). 
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certain.  Above all, the courts and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau would 
have had little if any role. 
China is not the only country of concern.  North Korean efforts 
toward the development of nuclear weapons and the capacity to use them 
against its neighbors—particularly Japan—have in recent months produced 
serious concern in Tokyo.  As a precautionary move in the interests of 
deterrence, on August 2, 2016, the Abe Government declared that North 
Korea poses “a grave and imminent threat” to Japan.41  In order to deter any 
further testing, within days the Ministry of Defense authorized use of force 
against any North Korean missile headed toward Japan.42  The issue is 
whether deterrence is effective in restraining an irrational regime. 
Sunakawa was the critical factor in enabling Article 9 to play such a 
political role.  Without set parameters except the caveat that any grave or 
“clear” violation could invite judicial intervention, the constitutional limits 
have depended on a relatively flexible but in fact enduring political 
consensus that has limited Japan’s military capacity to defensive weaponry 
and has, with minor exceptions, curtailed military actions unrelated to 
Japan’s defense.  Equally significant, such reliance on political consensus 
rather than fixed legal rules has also enabled Japan to expand its defensive 
military capacity.  Concomitantly the continued authority of Article 9 has 
also prevented Japan from succumbing to the risks and dangers of over-
reactive nationalist pressures.   
V.   CONCLUSION 
As indicated in the following essays, right of collective security 
actions that would involve military support from Japan when a foreign state 
but not Japan is under an imminent military threat has become the principal 
current issue.  Many rely on their own interpretations of the words of Article 
9 to deny such authority.  Yet until the Supreme Court acts, the 
constitutionality of collective security agreements and actions will remain a 
highly contested political issue for Japan.   
41  See Mari Yamaguchi, Japan calls North Korea’s nuclear and missile plan a ‘grave and imminent 
threat’, GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 2, 2016, 3:41 AM), http://globalnews.ca/news/2860092/japan-calls-north-
koreas-nuclear-and-missile-plan-a-grave-and-imminent-threat/. 
42 Tim Kelly, Japan orders military to be ready for North Korea missile launch at any time, YAHOO! 
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/japan-orders-military-ready-north-korea-missile-
launch-112122856.html. 
